We introduce a new core concept for an exchange economy with differential information which is contained in the coarse core concept of Wilson (1978). We prove the existence of: (i) a core allocation for an exchange economy with differential information and; (ii) an s-core strategy for a game in normal form with differential information.
Introduction
An exchange economy with differential information consists of a finite set of agents each of whom is characterized by a random utility function, a random initial endowment, a private information set and a prior.
The purpose of this paper is to study the following questions: How does one define the notion of the core in an exchange economy with differential information? What is the appropriate core concept? Under what conditions on agent's characteristics is the core nonempty?
With finitely many states of nature, the existence of a coarse core allocation for an economy with differential information follows easily from the well known result of Scarf (1967) , as first shown in a seminal paper by Wilson (1978) . However, with a continuum of states even if there is symmetric information (i.e., the information set of each agent is the same) the domain of the expected utility becomes infinite dimensional (even if there is only one good in the economy), and consequently Scarf's theorem is not directly applicable. It turns out that in the presence of a continuum of states, functional analytic methods as well as several measure theoretic results seem to be required. correspondence having a measurable graph, then ~(.) admits a measurable selection, i.e., there exists a measurable function f: T~ X such that f(t)~c~(t)#-a.e. Let (T, T, #) be a finite measure space and X be a Banach space. Following Diestel-Uhl (1977) 
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It can be shown [-see Diestel-Uhl (1977) Diestel-Uhl (1977, Theorem 1, p. 98) ] that if (T, T, g) is a finite measure space 1 < p < 0% and X is a Banach space, 1 1 then X* has the RNP if and only if (Lp(g, X))* = Lq(#, X*) where -+ -= 1. P q We will close this section by collecting some basic results on Banach lattices [for an excellent treatment see Aliprantis-Burkinshaw (1985) ]. Recall that a Banach lattice is a Banach space L equipped with an order relation > (i.e., > is a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation) satisfying:
(i) x > y implies x + z > y + z for every z in L, (ii) x > y implies 2x > 2y for all 2 > 0, (iii) for all x, y in L there exists a supremum (least upper bound) x v y and an infimum (greatest lower bound) x A y,
and [xl=xv (-x) Lindenstrauss-Tzafriri (1979, p. 28) ]. We finally note that Cartwright (1974) has shown that if X is a Banach lattice with order continuous norm (or equivalently X has weakly compact order intervals) then LI(/~, X), has weakly compact order intervals, as well. Cartwright's theorem will play a crucial role in the proof of our main results.
Model and results

The core of an exchange economy with differential information
Let Y be a separable Banach lattice with an order continuous norm, whose dual Y* has the RNP. 1 Let (.Q, F, #) be a complete finite measure space.
An exchange economy with differential information F={ (Xi, ul, e~,Fi,qi) : i = 1, 2 .... , n} is a set of quintuples (X~, u~, ei, Fi, ql) We are now ready to define the central notions of the paper.
I A basic example of a space which satisfies all these conditions is the Euclidean space Rk Remark 6.1 in Section 6 presents some more examples. 2 In the sequel by an abuse of notation, we will still denote by an Fi the a-algebra that the partition Fi generates. 
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The above blocking notion is the one adopted by Wilson (1978) to define his coarse core concept. 3 Note that since each y~(.) is A F;-measurable, the information is i~S verifiable by each member of the coalition. For instance, if we imagine that agents negotiate the terms of a contract, then Wilson's definition tells us that a coarse core allocation has the property that no coalition of agents can exchange their own information (in fact, information is verifiable by each member of the coalition) and make each agent in the coalition better off. In other words, contracts are realizable because information is verifiable. However, according to our condition (ii) of definition 3.1.1, information is not necessarily verifiable by all the members of the coalition (it is only privately verifiable). The latter makes the core smaller, i.e., any core allocation satisfying the definition 3.1.1 is a coarse core allocation as well. (Recall that if Yi(') is A Fi-measurable, it is also Fi-measurable; of course l~S the reverse is not true). Hence, the theorems that we will prove on the existence of core allocations will imply the existence of coarse core allocations as well.
Note that if we were to narrow the set of core allocations by replacing the Fi-measurability of yi(') in (ii) of definition 3.1.1 with the V F~-measurability of i~S y:.O--, l~ X~, then it is easy to construct examples which satisfy all the assumptions i~S of Theorem 3.1 below, but the core is empty [see Wilson (1978) or Berliant (1990) for examples to that effect]. We are not aware of any natural set of assumptions on utility functions and initial endowments which will guarantee the existence of such a core. Finally, it is worth pointing out that a core notion which allows for complete exchange of information among agents in each coalition may not be an appropriate concept since in most applications, agents do not have an incentive to reveal their own private information (think of situations of moral hazard or adverse selection). (ii) Vi(~o, xi)> V/(~o, el) for all i and for #-almost all ~o~.Q (where V i is given by (3.1)).
Finally, if the private information set of each agent, is the same (i.e., there is n symmetric information so Fi -F for all i) we call any x~ I] Lx, satisfying (i) and
(ii) of Definition 3.1.1 a symmetric core allocation for F.
We are now ready to state our first main result:
Theorem 3.1: Let F = { (X i, ul, el, Fi, ql) The following Corollaries follow directly from Theorem 3.1.
4 A similar notion is defined by Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) . 
The a-core of a game in normal form with differential information
A game in normal form with differential information B = { (X i, ul, Fi, qi) : i = 1, 2,..., n} is a set of quadruples (X i, ul, Fi, qi) where (1) Xi:12-~2 r is the strategy set-valued function of player i,
Fi is a (measurable) partition of (12, F) denoting the private information of player i, and (4) qi:12~R+ + is the prior of player i (i.e., qi is a Radon-Nikodym derivative having the property that S qi(t)d#(t) = 1). in Definition 3.2.1 indicates that no coalition of players is able to change its strategy (while each player in the coalition uses his/her own private information) and make the expected utility of each member in the coalition better off, no matter what the complementary coalition chooses to do (each member in the complementary coalition is also allowed to take advantage of his/her own private information). Following the previous definition of a coarse core allocation for an economy with differential information, we can define an e-coarse strategy for the game B, and show that the set of c~-coarse core strategies contains the set of a-core strategies for the game B.
Since there is no exchange of information among players in each coalition one may suggest that it is possible to analyze games in normal form with differential information (or economies with different information) in a noncooperative setting adopting the notion of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium or correlated equilibrium. However, the latter concepts do not yield Pareto optimal outcomes, contrary to the core or a-core. It seems to us that selecting outcomes out of the Pareto frontier is an attractive property for an allocation mechanism to have. The latter makes the core concept appealing in an economy with differential information.
We can now state our second main result. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1
We first state the well-known core existence result of Scarf (1967) [see also Border (1984) or Yannelis (1990) for recent generalizations] which is going to play a crucial role in the proof of Theorem 3.1. We will first need some notation. Let E = { (Xi, ul, ei) : i= 1,2 ..... n} be an exchange economy, where
(1) X i ~ R t is the consumption set of agent i, Note the existence of a core allocation for G implies the existence of a core allocation for the original economy F = {(X i, ui, e~, F~, q~): i = 1, 2 ..... n}. Hence, all we need to show is that a core allocation exists in the economy G. To this end we first show that for each i, Lx, is closed, bounded, convex, nonempty and that P~:Lx,-~2 L~, is convex valued having a weakly open graph (i.e., the set
Gp, = {(x,y)~Lx~ x Lx,:y~P,(x)} is weakly open in Lx, x Lx).
Note the fact that Lx~ is convex, closed and bounded follows directly from assumption (a.3.1). To prove that Lx~ is nonempty, recall that X~:~-~2 r* is F,-measurable, nonempty, closed valued and therefore Gx, eFi| By the Aumann (1967) measurable selection theorem, we can obtain an F~-measurable function f~: ~ Y+ such that fi(e~)~Xi(r # -a.e. Since X~ is integrably bounded, we can conclude that f, eL~(#, Y+). Hence, f~Lx, and this proves that Lx, is nonempty.
In order to show that for each i, P~ has a weakly open graph, we will first need the following claim6: completes the proof of the claim. In view of Claim 4.1 we can now conclude that for each i,P~ has a weakly open graph. Moreover, since for each co~, u i (co, .) is concave so is Vi(co, .) and therefore, P~ is convex valued. We will now construct a suitable family of truncated subeconomies in a finite dimensional commodity space, each of which satisfies the assumptions of Scarf's theorem. Applying Scarf's theorem, we will obtain a net of core allocations for each subeconomy. By taking limits we will show that the existence of a core allocation for each subeconomy implies the existence of a core allocation for the original economy G.
Let Hence (4.6) holds and this completes the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
We begin by stating the e-core existence result of Scarf (1971) which is going to be used in the proof of Theorem 3.2. It is easy to see that the existence of an a-core strategy for B implies the existence of an a-core strategy for the original game B = { (X~, uz, Fi, q~):i = 1, 2, .... n}. Our goal is to construct aa suitable family of truncated subgames in a finite dimensional strategy space, each of which satisfies all the conditions of the Scarf (1971) theorem. Therefore we will obtain a net of a-c0re strategies for each subgame. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, operating a limiting argument we can show that the existence of an a-core strategy for each subgame implies the existence of an a-core strategy for the original game B. Before we start the outlined construction of the family of truncated subgames, we need to make some observations. Proof: The proof is based on the celebrated theorem of James (1964) and it is patterned after that Khan (1982) . Note that the dual of LI(#, Y) is L~(#, Y**) (where w* denotes the w*-topology), i.e., (LI(p, Y))* = Lo~ (p, Y**) [see, for instance, , Tulcea-Tulcea (1969) ]. Let x be an arbitrary element of L~(p, Yw*). If we show that x attains its supremum on Lx, the result will follow from Jame's theorem [James (1964) ]. Let, Sup ~p'x= Sup ~ (~,(co)'xgo))dp ((n) .
Note that by Theorem 2.2 in Hiai-Umegaki (1977) , Recall that the spaces in (iv) and (v) do not have the RNP moreover, order intervals are not weakly compact in Loo [0, 1] and C(X). Remark 6.2: The separability assumption on Y was used in order to make the Aumann measurable selection theorem applicable. The latter result was used in several steps in the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. The relaxation of the separability of Y is possible. In this case however, the consumption set Lx, will be the set of all Gelfand integrable selections from the set-valued function Xi:.Q ~ 2 r*, and one will need to appeal to results on the existence of weak* measurable selections. Remark 6.3: Theorem 3.1 and its Corollaries can be easily extended to coalition production economies provided that the production technology is assumed to be balanced. The proof remains essentially unchanged.
Remark 6.4: Kahn and Mookerjee (1989) , have introduced a core-like concept in order to analyse games in normal form with differential information. Their concept in a two-person game, coincides with the coalitional Nash equilibrium. No existence results are given in their paper. However, it is known [see, for instance, Scarf (1971) ] that even if preferences are strictly convex and continuous the set of coalitionaal Nash equilibrium strategies may be empty.
Remark 6.5: We conjecture that the core of a large finite private information economy will converge to the standard Debreu-Scarf (1963) core notion, with the approximation getting finer the larger the private information economy (this will follow from the law of large numbers provided there is some kind of independence among agents). Hence, we can conclude that core allocations in large private information economy will become Walrasian. We also conjecture that without the independence assumption among agents, core allocations in a large private information economy will characterize some kind of rational expectations equilibrium. 7
